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Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.: Apportioning the
Fault of Immune Employers
The right of an employee injured at work to receive
workers' compensation benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act1 represents a compromise between employees
and employer^.^ The employee receives a predictable, though
somewhat limited, recovery from the employer without the
costly and time-consuming process of litigation ordinarily required to establish the employer's negligence: while maintaining the right to bring suit against negligent third-partied The
employer, in exchange for providing the insurance or benefits:
1. UTAH CODEANN. $5 35-1-1 to -107 (1988) (text of the Workers' Compensation Act).
2. United Air Lines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 151 P.2d 591, 595
(Utah 1944); RAYJ. DAVIS, UTAHWORKERS'COMPENSATION
LAW 1-15 (1988); see
also Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah
1983) (employees and employers have rights and obligations under the Workers'
Compensation Act).
3. UTAHCODEANN. $ 35-1-45 (1988) (injured employees "shall be paid compensation"); see FOWLERV. HARPER ET AL., THE LAWOF TOWS $ 11.2 at 70, 75
(2d ed. 1986) (liability not based on fault; workers' compensation reduces court proceedings); 1 ARTHUR
LARSON,THE LAWOF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION
§ 2.10 (1993)
(liability not based on negligence of employer or innocence of employee); Note,
Utah's Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease Laws, 1983 UTAHL. REV.
573, 575 [hereinafter Utah's Workers' Compensation] (Workers' Compensation Act
helps avoid "expensive and time-consuming" litigation); see also Baker v. Wycoff, 79
P.2d 77, 85 (Utah 1938) (liability does not depend on the negligence of the employer); Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (proof of
fault not required in workers' compensation cases); Large v. Industrial Comm'n,
758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (workers' compensation system "excludes
consideration of faultw).
4. Concerning the right of an employee to sue third-parties, the Workers'
Compensation Act provides the following:
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under
this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than an employer . . . the injured employee . . . may claim
compensation and the injured employee . . . may also have an action for
damages against such third person.
UTAH CODEANN. 8 35-1-62 (1988).
5. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employer has three options for
securing workers' compensation benefits for its employees: (1) "by insuring . . .
with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah"; (2) "by insuring . . . with any
stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of
workers' compensation insurance in [Utah]"; or (3) "by furnishing annually t o the
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is guaranteed immunity from suit by the employee6 and the
right to reimbursement for any benefits paid to the employee if
the employee recovers from third-parties.' This balancing of
interests requires both employees and employers t o give and
take?
In comparison with the Workers' Compensation Act, the
Utah Liability Reform Act provides the method for determining
and apportioning the fault of plaintiffs, defendants, and other
. ~ essence, the Act
parties in an action for personal i n j ~ r i e s In
provides that no person will be liable for more than his or her
proportional share of fault.''

commission satisfadory proof of financial ability to pay direct compensation in the
amount . . . provided for in this title." UTAHCODEANN. 8 35-1-46 (1988).
6. Id. $ 35-1-60. This section of the Workers' Compensation Act provides
that the compensation received by the employee "shall be the exclusive remedy
against the employer . . . [and] shall be in place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever, . . . and no action at law may be maintained against an employer . . .
based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee." This is known as the
"exclusive remedy" provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Dahl v. Kerbs
Constr. Corp., 853 P.2d 887, 888 (Utah 1993) (employer immune from suit by employee); Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah 1989) (employer
shielded by "exclusive remedy immunity" conferred by the Workers' Compensation
Act); Morrill v. J & M Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1981) (workers' compensation is "exclusive vehicle for recovery").
7. With respect to the employer's reimbursement right, the Workers' Compensation Act provides the following:
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as follows: . . . (2) The person liable for compensation payments
shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made less the proportionate
share of costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
UTAH CODEANN. 5 35-1-62 (1988).
8. See DAVIS,supra note 2, a t 1-16 (employers and employees each have
benefits and burdens under workers' compensation); Utah's Workers' Compensation,
supra note 3, a t 573-74 (employers and employees give up rights in exchange for
benefits); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187,
1190 (Utah 1983) (employees and employers each have "rights and obligations");
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah's, Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petition
for Rehearing at app. 12, Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993)
(No. 910482) (workers' compensation is a "careful balancing" of rights).
9. UTAH CODEANN. 5s 78-27-37 to -43 (1992) (text of the Liability Reform
Act).
10. Sections 78-27-38 to 78-27-40 are the key sections of the Liability Reform
Act. Section 78-27-38 defines "comparative negligence":
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by
that person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants
whose fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault
attributable to that defendant.
UTAH CODEANN. 8 78-27-38 (1992).

-
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In Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.," the Utah Supreme
Court interpreted the Liability Reform Act in the context of an
employee/third-party suit in which an employee had been injured a t work as a result of the negligence of his employer and
other third-parties." The court concluded that the Liability
Reform Act allowed the fault of the employer to be determined
and apportioned, despite the employer's immunity under the
Workers' Compensation Act.13 To some, the court's decision
disrupted the underlying principles of the Workers' Compensation A d by including the employer in the apportionment process and thereby limiting the recovery a n employee will receive
from third-parties. l4
This Note examines the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Sullivan. Part I1 provides the background for the court's decision by briefly summarizing the development of comparative
negligence in Utah in the context of the Workers' Compensation Act. Part I11 states the facts of the Sullivan case and presents the reasoning behind the court's decision. Part IV analyzes
Sullivan in light of the plain language and legislative history of
the Liability Reform Act. Finally, this Note concludes that the
court misinterpreted the legislative intent of the Liability Reform Act and proposes a legislative solution to resolve the inequities resulting from the Sullivan decision.

Section 78-27-39 contains the mechanism for determining and apportioning
fault:
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct
the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total
amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
Id. 8 78-27-39.
Section 78-27-40 provides the following:
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or
proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution
from any other person.
Id. 3 78-27-40.
11. 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993).
12. See id. at 878.
13. Id. at 884; see infra text accompanying note 43.
14. See Srcllivan, 853 P.2d at 885 (Stewart, J., dissenting); GOVERNOR'STASK
FORCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION,
FINAL REPORT 18-19 (1993) [hereinafter
GOVERNOR'S
TASKFORCE];Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah's, Amicus Curiae
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 8, Sullivan (No. 910482); see infra
note 111.
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In 1986, the Utah Legislature enacted the Liability Reform
Act which modified the Comparative Negligence Act of 1973.15
The Liability Reform Act dispensed with joint and several liability under the Comparative Negligence Act, but left intact the
doctrine of comparative negligence.l6
Prior to the Liability Reform Act, when an employee was
injured a t work as a result of the negligence of both the employer and a third party, the employer was not liable under
joint and several liability for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor because the employers' 'liability to the employee sprang
from the Workmen's Compensation Act and not from tort
law."" Therefore, since the employer was not liable for contribution based on joint and several liability, the third party "bore
the risk of paying not only his or her share of the plaintiff"^
damages, but also the shares of [the employer and] other tortfeasors who were impecunious or immune from s ~ i t . " ' ~
The issue presented the court in Sullivan was whether
under the Liability Reform Act the fault of immune employers
should be determined and included i n the apportionment process. To answer this question, the court analyzed the plain
language and legislative history of the Act, and in addition

15. 1986 Utah Laws 199; Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 885 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
For a general discussion of the Comparative Negligence Act of 1973, see E. Wayne
Thode, Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, and the Effect of
a Release-A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature, 1973 UTAHL. REV.406.
16. 1986 Utah Laws 199; Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 885 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
see also Brad C. Betebenner, Comment, The Liability Reform Act: A n Approach to
Equitable Application, 1987 J. CONTEMP.
L. 89, 91-97 (noting the effect of the abolishment of joint and several liability). The Liability Reform Act states that a
plaintiff can "recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own." UTAHCODEANN. $ 78-27-38 (1992).
17. Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 369 (Utah 1990) (an
employer is "not liable for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor"); see also Shell
Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Utah 1983)
(employer cannot be joint tort-feasor); Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153,
154 (Utah 1980) (employer cannot be joint tort-feasor); Curtis v. Harmon Elec.,
Inc., 552 P.2d 117, 118 (Utah 1976) (employer cannot be a joint tort-feasor).
18. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 882; see Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 663 F. Supp.
268, 274 n.9 @. Utah 1987) ("[Als a matter of law, [the third party] is the sole
cause of liability' that could be paid to the plaintiff."); Freund, 793 P.2d at 369 (an
employer is "not liable for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor"); Thode, supra
note 15, at 419 & n.42 (defendant third party liable for non-parties); HENRY
WOODS,COMPARATIVE
FAULT§ 13:13, at 272-73 & n.1 (2d ed. 1987) (employer not
subject to contribution).
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considered the equities of apportionment and how other jurisdictions apportion fault in employeelthird-party actions.lg
111. SULLNANv. SCOULAR
GRAINCo.

A. The Facts
In October 1986, Scoular Grain Co., Freeport Center Associates, and Scoular Grain Co. of Utah (collectively "Scoular")
employed Kenneth Sullivan to work at the Freeport Center in
Clearfield, Utah.20 The Freeport Center is a commercial grain
storage facility comprising several rows of warehouses connected by railroad tracks2' At the Freeport Center, the Scoular
employees are responsible for unloading the grain into the
warehouses after its delivery by r a i l r ~ a d . ' ~
On October 17, 1986, Sullivan was monitoring the unloading of grain from a railroad car while standing between two
empty cars.23 Unknown to Sullivan, other loaded cars were
being pushed down the track towards these empty cars?*
When the cars crashed into one another, Sullivan was knocked
to the ground and run over.25 As a result of the accident,
Sullivan lost his left arm and left leg?
In 1987, Sullivan filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah (the "trial court") against
Scoular, Union Pacific Railroad, Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad, Oregon Short Line Railroad, Utah Power & Light Co.,
Trackmobile, Inc., and G.W. Van Keppel CO.~'alleging negligence; failure to train, instruct and warn; strict products liability and other causes of action.28 In 1989, the trial court dismissed Scoular as a defendant after finding it immune from
plaintiff's claim under the exclusive remedy provision of the
Workers' Compensation Act.2g The trial court also dismissed
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad after finding it had no

19.
20.
2 1.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
remedy'

Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878-84.
Brief for Petitioner Trackmobile, Inc. at 3-5, Sullivan (No. 910482).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8; Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1993).
Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878.
Brief for Petitioner Trackmobile, Inc. at 5-6, Sullivan (No. 910482).
Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878. See supra note 6 for the text of the "exclusive
provision.
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legal duty to S ~ l l i v a n . ~Thereafter,
'
defendant Trackmobile
moved to have the jury determine and apportion the fault of all
originally named defendants, including S c o ~ l a r . ~ '
The trial court found no Utah law controlling the allocation
of fault of a n immune employer,s2 and therefore certified the
following question to the Utah Supreme Court:33
Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Annot.
$ 78-27-38, et seq., can a jury apportion the fault of the
plaintiff's employers that caused or contributed to the accident although said employers are immune fiom suit under
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. $ 35-1-60,
et seq?'

The Utah Supreme Court accepted the certification and concluded that a jury may determine and apportion the fault of
employers despite their immunity from liability under the
Workers' Compensation

B. The Reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court
The Utah Supreme Court began its analysis of whether the
fault of a n immune employer may be determined and apportioned in a n employee/third-party suit by noting an ambiguity

30. Sulliuan, 853 P.2d at 878.
31. Id. at 879.
32. Brief for Petitioner Trackmobile, Inc. at 3, Sullivan (No. 910482).
33. Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure permits a court of the
United States to certify a question to the Utah Supreme Court. The relevant portion of rule 41 provides the following:
TO ANSWER QUESTIONS OF LAW. The Utah Supreme
(a) AUTHORIZATION
Court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the
United States when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in
accordance with the provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah
applicable to a proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain.
UTAH R. APP. P. 41.
34. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878. As the court noted, the correct name for what
the district court entitled the "Utah Comparative Fault Act" is the "Liability Reform Act." Id. at 878 n.1; 1986 Utah Laws 199.
35. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 884. In addition to the question concerning immune
employers, the court also accepted certification of a question outside the scope of
this Note. That question asked whether "[ulnder the Utah Comparative Fault Act,
Utah Code Ann. 5 78-27-38, et seq., can a jury apportion the fault of an individual
or entity that has been dismissed from the litigation but against whom it is
claimed that they have caused or contributed to the accident." Id. at 878. The
court concluded that "[a] jury may not apportion the fault of a party that has been
dismissed from the lawsuit pursuant to an adjudication on the merits of the liability issue." Id. at 884.
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in the Liability Reform Act caused by the Workers9Compensation
The court found that because of the "exclusive
the
remedy" provision of the Workers' Compensation Act:'
Liability Reform Act's definition of "defendant"38 seemed t o
define "defendant" in such "a way that appear[ed] t o preclude
inclusion of an employer from app~rtionment."~~
However, the
court noted that sections 78-27-38 and 78-27-40 of the Liability
Reform Act seemed t o indicate that the employer's fault should
be included in the apportionment process.40
Since one section of the Liability Reform Act seemed to
preclude inclusion of the employer's fault from apportionment,
while other sections of the Act seemed to require it, the court
concluded that it was "faced with two arguably contradictory
statutes within the same article."41 Thus, an ambiguity existed requiring "the court to make a policy inference as t o the
overall purpose and intent of the Act."42
The court concluded that the purpose and intent of the
Liability Reform Act was to include immune employers in the
apportionment process so that the remaining defendants were
not liable in "excess of their proportion of fault.''43 In support
of this conclusion, the court analyzed the legislative history of
the Liability Reform Act and concluded that one of its main
purposes was to abolish joint and several liability.44The court
reasoned that if the immune employer is not included in the
apportionment process "one of the major evils of joint and several liability would result" since third-parties would be liable
for the fault of the immune employer.45In addition, the court
found that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act "does not bar the [employer] from the apportion-

36. Id. at 879-80.
37. Id. at 879; see supm note 6 .
38. Defendant is defrned as "any person not immune from suit who is claimed
to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery." UTAHCODE ANN.
8 78-27-37(1)(1992).
39. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 880.
40. Id. at 879-80. See supra note 10 for the text of sections 78-27-38 and 7827-40.
41. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 880.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see infro, notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
45. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 880.
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ment process because apportionment is not an action at law
and would not impose any civil liability on the [employer]."46
The court also noted three reasons why including the employer in the apportionment process would not prejudice the
employer. First, the court reasoned that the employer has "a
fmancial interest in the outcome of the [employeelthird-party]
action.'"" This interest arises because of the reimbursement
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act which provides
that the person liable48for compensation shall be reimbursed
"for all payments made" if the employee recovers from a third
party.49
Second, the Workers' Compensation Act provides that the
employer o r its insurer "shall" receive notice and have a reasonable opportunity to appear in an employeelthird-party actioa50
Third, under section 78-27-39 of the Liability Reform Act, a
jury may determine and apportion the fault of a "person seeking recovery."' A "person seeking recovery" is defined as "any
person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf,
or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
repre~entative."~~
The court reasoned that because of the re-

46. Id. at 881.
47. Id.
48. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employer has three options for
securing workers' compensation benefits for its employees: (1) "by insuring . .
with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utahn; (2) "by insuring . . with any

.

.

stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of
workers' compensation insurance in [Utah]"; or (3) "by furnishing annually to the
commission satisfactory proof of fmancial ability to pay direct compensation in the
amount . . . provided for in this title." UTAHCODEANN. 8 35-1-46 (1988). Therefore, it is possible that the employer's insurer, and not the employer, will have
paid the workers' compensation benefits and hence the insurer, and not the employer, will have the financial interest.
49. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-62(2) (1988); see supra note 7 and accompanying
text.

50. See Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 881. The relevant portion of section 35-1-62 of
the Utah Code provides the following:
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in the
case of death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the
carrier or other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order
to give such person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in
the proceeding.
UTAHCODE ANN. 8 35-1-62 (1988).
51. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 881. See infra note 79 and accompanying text for
full text of section 78-27-39.
52. UTAH CODEANN. 8 78-27-37(3) (1992).
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imbursement provision of the Workers' Compensation
the employer or its insurer "may be legitimately viewed as
persons seeking recovery under the
In addition, the court looked to other jurisdictions and a t
the competing equitable interests of the parties to find support
for its decision.55 The court found that although "somewhat
different statutes" were invol~ed;~
other states in the Pacifi
Reporter generally apportioned the fault of immune employe r ~ . ~The
' court also noted that the Liability Reform Act had
shifted the risk caused by "immune tort-feasors to the plaintiffs
by abolishing joint and several liability."58 Additionally, under
general comparative negligence theory, the court found "it is
accepted practice for the jury to apportion the comparative
fault of all tortfeasors," including immune employers.59 Accordingly, the court concluded that the "plaintifYs remedy on
this point is a legislative one."'

IV.

ANALYSIS

This case presented the court a complex set of statutory
interpretation problems requiring a determination of how the
legislature intended to apportion fault "when one of the parties
whose negligence contributed to the plaintiffs injuries is immune f'rom liability.'*' The problem this issue presented can
be illustrated in the following hypothetical.

53. Id. 8 35-1-62; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
54. Sullivan, 853 P.2d a t 881.
55. Id. at 881-83.
56. Id. at 881.
57. In summarizing the apportionment rules of the various states in the Pacifw Reporter, the court grouped the states into four categories: first, states that
have expressly adopted the practice of apportioning the fault of immune employers
(Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and Washington); second, states that have
interpreted their "general comparative negligence statutes to require apportionment
of nonparty fault* (California, Hawaii, Idaho, Oklahoma, and Wyoming); third,
states which "retain joint and several liability but allow the consideration of nonparty negligence for the limited purpose of determining whether all or none of the
total fault can be attributed to the nonparty" (Alaska and Montana); and fourth,
states which "refuse to allow a jury to consider the fault of nonparties in apportionment* (Nevada and Oregon). Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 881, app. 884-85 (Citations
to the state codes are in the Appendix.).
58. Id. at 882; see B e t e b e ~ e r supra
,
note 16, at 94, 96.
59. Sullivan, 853 P.2d a t 882-83.
60. Id. at 883.
61. Id. at 885 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

196

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

A. Hypothetical
Assume an employee is injured at work because of the
negligence of the employer and a third party. A jury would find
that the employer is sixty percent at fault," and the third
party is forty percent at fault. The jury would also find that the
employee, who was without fault, sustained $1,000,000 in damages.
The employee's exclusive remedy against the employer is
determined by the Workers' Compensation Act." Therefore,
the employee will receive from the employer or its insurerG4a
statutorily determined amount of compensation based on the
severity of the
Assume that under the Workers' Compensation Act, the employee is entitled t o $300,000 in compensation." The employee then sues the third party.
At trial, the third party requests that the fault of the employer be determined and included in the apportionment pro~ess.~
Assuming
'
the court denies the request, the third party
62. In this hypothetical and in the hypothetical appearing later in the Note,
the employee is without fault. See infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
While a completely faultless employee is unlikely, an i ~ o c e n temployee best illustrates the principles involved in this case and the impact of the court's decision
on the employee's recovery.
63. UTAHCODEANN. 5 35-1-60 (1988); see supra note 6.
64. See supra note 48.
65. Utah's WorkersJ Compensation, supra note 3, at 606-614. Sections 35-1-64
to 35-1-81 of the Workers' Compensation Act set forth the amount of compensation
received by an employee for an injury and the manner of its distribution. While
the statutory amount of compensation provides some financial support for the injured employee, the amount of compensation received typically represents only a
fraction of the employee's previous salary. For example, section 35-1-67 provides
the compensation level for a permanent total disability. In part the section provides:
For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312week entitlement, compensation shall be 66 213% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of
$45 per week, plus $5 for a dependant spouse, plus $5 for each
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of
four such dependent minor children . . . .
UTAH CODE ANN. 8 35-1-67(2) (1988). For more on the monetary inadequacies of
supra note 3, at 78-79.
workers' compensation, see HARPER,
66. As of December 1990, Sullivan had received over $275,000 in workers'
compensation benefits as a result of his accident. Reply Brief of Certified Respondent K e ~ e t hSullivan at 7, Sullivan (No. 910482).
67. In this hypothetical and in similar hypotheticals used by the majority and
the dissent in Sullivan, the assumption is that regardless of the number of plain-
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will be liable for $1,000,000, rather than its actual proportional
Therefore, the employee will receive
fault share of $400,000.~~
$300,000 of workers' compensation and $1,000,000 from the
third party for a total of $1,300,000. However, the $1,000,000
received by the employee from the third party is subject to the
reimbursement right of the employer o r its insurersg who has
paid $300,000 to the employee.70The net result is the employee receives $1,000,000, all of which has been paid by the third
party which was responsible for only forty percent of the
fault.
However, if the employer's fault is included in the apportionment process, the third party will be liable for $400,000
since the third party is only forty percent at fault." Therefore,
the employee will receive $300,000 of workers' compensation
and $400,000 from the third party for a total of $700,000. But
again, the $400,000 received by the employee from the third
party is subject to the reimbursement right of the employer or
its insurer.73 The net result is the employee receives only
$400,000.

B. The Duty of the Court is to Interpret the Statute
in Light of Legislative Intent

As this hypothetical demonstrates, whichever choice the
court makes is unfair. If the employer is excluded from the
apportionment process, the third party is liable for more than

tiffs, defendants, or parties contributing to the injury of the employee, the jury
must allocate 100% of the fault. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 879, 886. As a result, if a
party which contributed to the injury of the employee is not included in the special
verdict as provided for in section 78-27-39 of the Liability Reform Ad, the parties
included in the special verdict will be responsible for the missing parties negligence
since the jury must allocate 10W0 of the fault. The Utah Model Jury Instructions
also provides for the allocation of 10Wo of the fault in this type of situation. MODEL UTAHJURY
INSTRUCTIONS-CML 36.2 (1993).
68. $1,000,000 x 4Wo (the third-party's fault) = $400,000. See UTAH CODE
ANN. 8 78-27-40 (1992) (defendant only liable for proportion of fault).
69. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
70. See UTAH CODEANN. 5 35-1-62 (1988); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra note 93 and accompanying text.
71. This would be the result under pre-Liability Reform Act cases since under
joint and several liability, the employer was not liable for contribution. See supra
notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
72. See UTAH CODEANN. 5 78-27-40 (1992) (defendant only liable for proportion of fault).
73. UTAH CODEANN. !j 35-1-62 (1988); see supra note 7 and accompanying
text; infia note 93 and accompanying text.

198

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

its actual proportional fault share. But if the employer is included, the combination of the inclusion of the employer's fault
in the apportionment process and the reimbursement right of
the employer or its insurer will severely diminish the net damage award of the injured employee. In short, the court must
choose between two evils.
Nevertheless, the court has a duty to interpret the statute
notwithstanding the deas written by the Utah Legi~lature,?~
cisions of other courts75 in other jurisdiction^.^^ In this case,
the court misinterpreted the intent of the legislature with respect to the apportionment of fault of a n immune employer.
This misinterpretation can be seen from the plain language of
the Liability Reform Act and the Act's legislative history.

74. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1950); see also
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984) (court's primary responsibility is to "give effect to the intent of the legislature"); Parson Asphalt
Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980) ("over-arching principle" is that statutes be "construed and applied in accordance with the
intent of the Legislature").
75. See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah
1984). In Jensen, the court concluded that while the Utah Legislature had adopted
part of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act of 1973 from a similar Wisconsin
rule, the Legislature did not intend to adopt the Wisconsin interpretation of the
statute. Under Wisconsin law, the negligence of each individual defendant in a
multiple defendant case is compared against the negligence of the plaintiff to determine liability. The court rejected this interpretation and concluded that the total
negligence of all defendants should be compared t o the negligence of the plaintiff.
But see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
76. While the court's reference to how other states apportion fault in employeelthird-party actions is helpful, the court fails to note significant differences in the
employer's reimbursement right in some of those states. For example, in Kansas
and New Mexico, the employer's recovery is diminished by the percentage of the
employer's negligence. KAN. STAT. ANN. 8 44-504(d) (1986); N.M. STAT.ANN. 8 52-110.1 (Michie 1991); see infizt note 112. In Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming, the
employee receives a specific percentage of any damage award received from a third
party regardless of the amount of compensation paid by the employer or insurer.
OR. REV. STAT. 5 656.593 (1991); WASH. REV. CODEANN. 5 51.24.060 (West 1990);
WYO. STAT. 8 27-14-105 (1991); see infh note 112. This information is significant
because while some of these states apportion the employer's negligence, they temper the impact this would otherwise have on the employee's recovery by limiting in
some way the employer's reimbursement. Thus, the result is less drastic than the
result in Sullivan, in which the employer's negligence is apportioned and the employer or its insurer still receives full reimbursement.
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1. The plain language of the Liability Reform Act indicates

immune employers are not to be included in the apportionment
process
The court in Sullivan stated "the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute."" Sections 7827-38 and 78-27-39 contain the key language of the Liability
Reform Act. Section 78-27-38 defines "comparative negligence":
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar
recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However,
no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.78

Section 78-27-39 contains the mechanism for determining and
apportioning fault:
The trial court may, and when requested by any party
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person
seeking recovery and to each defendant."

Based on these sections of the Liability Reform Act, in order for
the fault of the employer to be determined and apportioned by
the jury the employer must be at "fault" and be either a "person seeking recovery" or a "defendant."
a. Employers are not at "fault."The Liability Reform Act
defines "fault" as "any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or
omission proximately causing or contributing t o injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery."80 Therefore, in
order for the empioyer's negligence to be apportioned according
to section 78-27-39, the employer's "fault" must be an "actionable breach of legal duty."
When an employee suffers work-related injuries, the employee automatically receives compensation from the employer
or its insurers1 without a determination of the employer's
77. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 1993); see also
Jensen, 679 P.2d at 906 ("The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the
Legislature in enacting [an act] is the plain language of the [a]&.").
78. UTAHCODEANN. $ 78-27-38 (1992) (emphasis added).
79. Id. $ 78-27-39 (emphasis added).
80. Id. $ 78-27-37(2).
81. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employee injured "by lanl acci-
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and is also expressly barred from bringing suit against
n ~essence,
the employer based on the employer's n e g l i g e n ~ e I. ~
the right of the employee to receive workers' compensation
benefits is based not on the "fault" of the employer, but rather
on the employee/employer relationship." Therefore, the immune employer's negligence, if any, is not a n "actionable
breach of legal duty" because the employee has no right to sue
the employer.85Based on these considerations, the court incorrectly concluded that the jury may determine and apportion the
"fault" of employers under the Liability Reform Act?
b. Employers are not 'Ipersons seeking recovery." Section
78-27-37(3) of the Liability Reform Act defines a "person seeking recovery" as "any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom
it is authorized to act as legal repre~entative."~'
Such a person
is subject to the comparative negligence provision of the Liability Reform Act which states that a person seeking recovery
"may [only] recover from any defendant or group of defendants
whose fault exceeds his own."88
Assuming, as did the court, that the employer may be
viewed as a "person seeking recovery" because of the reim-

dent arising out of and in the course of his employment, . . . shall be paid compensation for the loss sustained on account of the injury" by the employer or its
insurer. Id. 8 35-1-45 (emphasis added).
supra note 3, at 70; LARSON,supra note 3; see also Cudahy
82. See HARPER,
Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 US. 418 (1923) (workers' compensation statutes impose liability regardless of act or omission by employer); Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56, 62 (Utah 1992) (proof of fault not required in workers' compensation cases); Baker v. Wycoff, 79 P.2d 77, 85 (Utah 1938) (liability does not depend on the negligence of the employer); Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 74
P.2d 657, 658-59 (Utah 1937) ("[lo mpensation does not depend upon negligence");
Large v. Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (workers'
compensation system "excludes consideration of fault").
83. UTAH CODEANN. 8 35-1-60 (1988); see supm note 6 and accompanying
text.

84. Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah 1980); see also
Cudahy Packing, 263 U.S. at 423 (liability based on relationship); M-K Rivers v.
Schleifman, 599 P.2d 132, 134-35 (Alaska 1979) (liability based upon existence of
employment relationship); Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266, 272 (Cal.
1981) (liability based on relationship).
85. See supra note 6; see also Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877,
886 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (immune parties negligence is not actionable).
86. Sulliuan, 853 P.2d a t 884.
87. UTAH CODEANN.$ 78-27-37(3) (1992).
88. Id. 8 78-27-38.
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bursement provision of the Workers' Compensation Act:'
the
right of the employer or its insurer to reimbursement is then
subject to the comparative negligence provision of the Liability
Reform Act." Thus, under the court's reasoning, when an employee injured a t work sues a negligent third party, the employer or its insurer cannot seek reimbursement unless the
employer's fault is less than that of the third party."
However, this reasoning contradicts the reimbursement
right contained in the Workers7 Compensation
Section
35-1-62of the Act provides that "[ilf any recovery is obtained
against [a] third person," the person liable for compensation
payments "shall be reimbursed in full for all payments
made.'7g3This reimbursement right is not limited to when the
fault of the employer is less than the fault of the third party.g4
Therefore, the employer cannot be considered a "person
seeking recovery" without limiting the reimbursement right of
the employer or its insurer to situations in which the
employer's fault is less than the fault of the third party. Such a

89. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 881; see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
90. See Plaintiff Sullivan's Petition for Rehearing at 9-10, Sullivan (No.
9 10482).
91. See id.
92. UTAHCODEANN. 8 35-1-62 (1988).
93. Id. (emphasis added). The relevant portions of section 35-1-62 of the Utah
Code provide as follows:
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys'
fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties
as their interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the
injured employee or, in the case of death, by the dependents, for
any recovery had against the third party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of
costs and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his
heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any
obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
Id.
94. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 883 (The reimbursement right "is not reduced in
any respect by the amount by which the employer's a d or omission contributed to
the employee's injuries."); see UTAH CODEANN. 8 35-1-62 (1988) (This section does
not restrict when the provider of the workers' compensation can seek reimbursement from a third party.).
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definition would drastically alter the Workers' Compensation
Act. It is unlikely this was the intent of the legislature.
c. Employers are not "defendants." Section 78-27-37(1) of
the Liability Reform Act defines "defendant" as "any person not
immune from suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault
to any person seeking recovery."g5 This definition contains two
elements. First, a defendant cannot be a person that is immune
from suit. Second, a defendant must be claimed to be liable
because of fault.96
As noted, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act grants the employer immunity from suit by
a n employee accidentally injured a t work.g7 I n addition, the
employer's liability does not arise from the employer's "fault,"
but rather because of the employer/employee relationship."
Therefore, the employer is not a "defendant" under the Liability Reform Act.
2. The legislative history of the Liability Reform Act shows
the legislature did not intend immune employers to be included
in the apportionment process
Substitute Senate Bill No. 64, which ultimately became the
Liability Reform Act:' initially provided in part:
The trial court may, and when requested by any party
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to each other person

whose fault contributed to the injury or damages.'''
However, before enactment the italicized phrase was omitted
and the word "and" was inserted before "to each defen-

95. UTAHCODEANN. $ 78-27-37(1) (1992) (emphasis added).
96. See Reply Brief of Certified Respondent Kenneth Sullivan at 6, Sullivan
(No. 910482).
97. See supra notes 6, 81-86 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
99. See 1986 Utah Laws 199.
100. Substitute S. 64, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. $ 3 (1986) (emphasis added). A
copy of this bill can be found in the Brief of Certified Respondent Kenneth
Sullivan at app. E, Sullivan (No. 910482).
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dant."lO' The result is the present version of section 78-2739.102
The court in Sullivan essentially ignored the omission of
this phrase as evidence of legislative intent.lo3 Instead, the
court relied on a statement made by a senator during the floor
debates concerning the bill and one part of the titlelq of the
preliminary draft of the bill as evidence of legislative intent.lo5As noted by the dissent, the court dismissed the omission of this phrase "on the transparent ground that it is not
clear why the language was deleted."lo6
One possible reason for the omission of this phrase is that
the Legislature wanted t o make clear that immune employers
were not to be included in the apportionment process. If the
phrase had been included in the bill, it could have caused confusion as t o whether employers should be included in the apportionment process. However, left out, both the omission of
the phrase and the definitions of "fault," "person seeking recovery," and "defendant" provide a "compelling piece of legislative

101. Amendment to Substitute S. 64, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. 5 3 (1986) (State &
Local Standing Comm.). A copy of the letter containing the recommendations of the
Committee can be found in the Brief of Certified Respondent K e ~ e t hSullivan a t
app. F, Sullivan (No. 910482).
102. The current version of section 78-27-39 of the Utah Code provides the
following:
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct
the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total
amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
UTAHCODE ANN. 5 78-27-39 (1992).
103. See Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 880.
104. The full title of the preliminary draft of Senate Bill No. 64 states:
AN ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CODE; MODIFYING PROVISIONS RELATING TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE; SPECIFYING
DUTIES OF JURORS AND JUDGES; ABOLISHING JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG DEFENDANTS; REQUIRING FAULT OF DEFENDANTS TO BE DETERMINED
IN ONE TRIAL;AND DEFINING CERTAIN TERMS.
Substitute S. 64, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. 5 3 (1986). A copy of this bill can be found
in the Brief of Certified Respondent Kenneth Sullivan at app. E, Sullivan (No.
9 104.82).
105. Sullivan, 853 P.2d a t 880. In K e ~ e c o t tCopper Corp. v. Anderson, 514
P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1973), the court stated that "it should be assumed that all of
the words used in a statute were used advisedly and were intended to be given
meaning and effect. For the same reasons, the omissions should likewise be taken
note of and given effect."
106. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 886 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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history"'07 that the legislature did not intend the fault of an
immune employer t o be included in the apportionment pro~ess.~O~

C. A Possible Solution
In response t o criticism by Justice Stewart in S u l l i ~ a n , ' ~ ~
Justice Durham stated in a later opinion that "[als the author
of [Sullivan], I am not of the view that its result was necessarily 'good policy' . . . . I hope that the legislature will address the
issue."'1° It is likely that the legislature will soon address the
issue because of the court's conclusion in S~llivan."~
107. Id.
108. Assuming the legislature did not intend the fault of the employer to be
included in the apportionment process, a question arises as to the meaning of
section 78-27-40 of the Liability Reform Act which provides that the "maximum
amount for which a defendant may be liable . . . is that percentage or proportion
of damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant." UTAHCODEANN. 5 78-27-40 (1992); see supra note 10. Recalling that
the jury will apportion 100% of the fault among the parties on the special verdict
as provided for in section 78-27-39, if the employer is not included on the special
verdict the jury will simply apportion 100% of the fault among those parties on
the special verdict. See supra notes 10 and 67. Therefore, the jury will apportion
to some other party the negligence of the employer. See Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 886
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Thus, while it is true some parties will pay more than
their negligence would require if the employer were included on the special verdict,
no party will pay more than the proportion of fault attributed to them by the jury.
This result is unfair to the party which was apportioned the negligence of the
employer, but this was the result intended by the legislature. See infia note 111.
109. Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 885 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
110. Brown v. Boyer-Washington Boulevard Ass'n, 856 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah
1993) (Durham, J., concurring).
111. Following the court's decision in Sullivan, the Workers' Compensation
Fund of Utah filed an amicus curiae brief in support of a petition for rehearing
which was ultimately denied. Included within this brief were a number of &davits written by Utah senators and representatives in office when the Liability Reform Act was passed. In general, these &davits state that the legislature did not
intend to affect the workers' compensation system with the passage of the Liability
Reform Act. Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah's, Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing at app. 7, 9, Sullivan (No. 910482). Additionally, former Senator Paul Rogers, a sponsor of the Liability Reform Act, stated:
I have read the Supreme Court of Utah's decision in [Sullivan]. The
majority opinion therein determined a legislative intent contrary to my
intent as a sponsor of the legislation and contrary to the intent of the
Legislature. It was never the intent of the Legislature for the injured
employee to bear the burden of the employer's conduct alone by having
the third-party damages reduced by the employer's proportionate "fault"
and then requiring the injured worker to reimburse the employer the full
amount of the subrogation allowed by Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. of the Workers Compensation Act of Utah. Rather, the amendments which became a
part of the Act were designed to make it clear that the employer's con-
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One possible legislative solution is to allow the fault of the
immune employer to be determined and apportioned, but to
permit the employer or its insurer to be reimbursed only for
the amount paid in workers' compensation benefits that exceeds the employer's proportional fault share.'12 Such a solution would require the alteration of both the Liability Reform
Act and the Workers' Compensation Act.
With respect to the Liability Reform Act, the legislature
would need to alter the definition of "fault" as well as the apportionment provisions of the Act. If the word "actionable" were
removed from the definition of "fault" in section 78-2737(2),'13 and the excluded portions of section 78-27-39 of Senate Bill No. 64 were reinserted into the Act,'" the Liability
Reform Act would then legitimately do what the Sullivan court
did and allow for the determination and apportionment of the
immune employer's fault. 115

duct was not to be compared to that of the injured employee and the
defendantts) in a civil lawsuit. The employer's responsibility for all their
injured employees was provided for by their participation in the no-fault
workers compensation system.
Id. at app. 8 (emphasis omitted); see GOVERNOR'STASKFORCE,supra note 14, at
18-19 (recommending the legislature address the "potentially adverse effects of the
Sullivan decision.").
112. Kansas and New Mexico have similar types of statutes. In Kansas, "the
employer's subrogation interest or credits against future payments of compensation
. . . shall be diminished by the percentage of the damage award attributed to the
negligence of the employer." KAN. STAT.ANN. $ 44-504(d) (1986). In New Mexico,
"the employer's right t o reimbursement from the proceeds of the worker's recovery
in any action against any wrongdoer shall be diminished by the percentage of
fault, if any, attributed to the employer." N.M. STAT.ANN. $ 52-1-10.1 (Michie
1991). In Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming, the employee receives a specific percentage of any damage award received from a third party regardless of the amount
of compensation paid by the employer or insurer. OR. REV. STAT.$ 656.593 (1991)
(employee gets at least one-third of the balance of the recovery); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. $ 51.24.060 (West 1990) (employee gets at least twenty-five percent of the
balance of the award); WYO. STAT.$ 27-14-105 (1991) (employee gets at least twothirds of the total proceeds).
113. Section 78-27-37(2) would read as a follows:
"Fault" means any w&km&e breach of legal duty, ad, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all its
degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach
of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
115. In addition to allowing for the determination and apportionment of fault
of immune employers, these alterations of the Liability Reform Act would also
permit the determination and apportionment of fault of other previously immune
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Concerning the Workers' Compensation Act, the legislature
would need to modify the reimbursement provision. This would
require that subsection (2) of section 35-1-62'16 be replaced
with a provision such as follows:
The person liable for compensation payments shall be
reimbursed for all payments made in excess of the employer's
proportional fault, less the proportionate share of costs and
attorney's fees provided for in Subsection ( l ) . l 1 7

The advantage of this proposal is that third-parties would
be liable only for their proportional fault share, yet the
employee's recovery from the third party would not be
disproportionately reduced by both the inclusion of the
employer's fault in the apportionment process and by the reimbursement provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. A hypothetical will best illustrate these principles.
Assume an employee is injured a t work as a result of the
negligence of the employer and a third party. A jury would find
that the employer is twenty percent a t fault, the third party
eighty percent a t fault, and that the employee, who was not a t
all at fault, sustained $1,000,000 in damages.'" Under the
Workers' Compensation Act, the employee receives $300,000
from the employer or its insurer. The employee then brings suit
against the third party.
Assume further that the legislature has enacted the previously mentioned proposal^"^ and that the fault of the employer is determined and apportioned. Thus, the third party is
liable for $800,000, which represents its eighty percent proportional fault share under the Liability Reform Act, and the employer or its insurer is liable for the $300,000 based on the
parties. The legislature would have to determine whether these alterations sweep
too broadly and therefore require some limitations.
116. See supra note 93.
117. In addition to this provision, the Workers' Compensation Act would need
to provide that the employer be included in, or agree to, any employeelthird-party
settlement. The purpose for this provision is to avoid litigation after an employeelthird-party settlement to determine the amount of reimbursement to which the
employer is entitled. Including the employer in any settlement agreement allows
the employer t o protect its reimbursement interest and make necessary provisions
for reimbursement at the time of the settlement. See HAW.REV. STAT. 5 386-8
(1985) (settlement requires written consent of both employer and employee); OR.
REV.STAT.§ 656.587 (1991) ("written approval of paying agency or, in the event of
a dispute between the parties by order of the board").
118. See supra note 62.
119. See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
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Workers' Compensation Act. The employee receives a total of
$1,100,000.
However, the $800,000 paid by the third
to the employee is subject to the reimbursement right of the employer or
its insurer.120 But the reimbursement right only allows reimbursement for the amount paid by the employer or its insurer
in excess of the employer's proportional fault share.l2l In this
case, since the employer was twenty percent at fault, the employer's proportional fault share is $200,000. Therefore, the employer or its insurer can seek reimbursement only for the
amount of compensation paid above $200,000. In this case, the
employer or its insurer is reimbursed by the employee for
$100,000.
The result is that the third party is liable for $800,000,
which represents its eighty percent proportional fault share
under the Liability Reform Act; the employer or its insurer is
liable for $300,000 under the Workers' Compensation Act, but
can seek $100,000 in reimbursement from the $800,000 received by the employee from the third party; and the employee
receives $1,000,000 in total compensation ($800,000 from the
third party and $300,000 in workers' compensation, minus
$100,000 in reimbursement to the employer or its insurer). As
can be seen, this proposal more fairly allocates the fault of the
parties.

the Utah Supreme
In Sullivan v. Scoular Grain CO.,'~~
Court misinterpreted the intent of the legislature with respect
to the apportionment of fault of employers in an employeehhird-party suit. The court's error can be seen in both the
plain language of the Liability Reform Act and in the Act's
legislative history. As a result of the court's decision, an
employee's recovery from a negligent third party will be significantly reduced because of the inclusion of the employer's fault
in the apportionment process and the reimbursement right of
the employer or its insurer.
Because of the Sullivan decision, the legislature should act
to correct the court's error. The best solution is to amend both

120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993).
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the Liability Reform Act and the Workers' Compensation Act to
allow for the determination and apportionment of the
employer's fault, but to limit the reimbursement right of the
employer or its insurer to the amount paid in excess of the
employer's proportional fault share. By so doing, the legislature
would more fairly allocate the fault of employers, employees,
and third-p arties.123

Dale T. Hansen

123. Shortly before publication of thise Note, the Utah Legislature altered the
method of recovery and reimbursement in employeelthird-party suits. In essence,
the Legislature provided that the employer's fault in employeelthird-party suits will
always be apportioned by the jury. If the jury determines that the employer's fault
is less than 40%, the trial court will reallocate the employer's fault among the
other parties in proportion to the percentage of fault attributed to each party.
However, if the employer's fault is determined to be equal to or greater than 40%,
the employer's fault will be included in the apportionment process, but it will also
be used to reduce the employer's reimbursement by the percentage of the
s Lloyd, Vice President and
employer's fault. Telephone Conversation with D e ~ i V.
General Counsel for the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah (Mar. 9, 1994); see
Substitute S. 224, Gen. Sess. (1994); Top Business Issues in 1994 Session, UTAH
MANUFACTURERS
ASS% BULL.,Mar. 1994, at 1.

